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BOOK REVIEW
In Madison’s Music: On Reading the First 
Amendment, Burt Neuborne, the Inez Milholland 
Professor of Civil Liberties and the founding legal 
director of the Brennan Center for Justice at NYU Law 
School, has set out a vision of the First Amendment 
that is democratic, inclusive, and aspirational. The 
First Amendment, he argues, should be understood 
as a “chronologically organized blueprint of democ-
racy in action” (page 18). After making a case for this 
reading, Neuborne’s engaging book sets out an array 
of ways that the Supreme Court’s First Amendment 
jurisprudence would be different if the justices 
recognized these democratic underpinnings.  
HOW TO INTERPRET THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Neuborne begins his book by explaining why 
“[r] eading the First Amendment isn’t easy” (page 5). 
He notes, quite correctly, that the current interpretive 
approaches to the Constitution — whether focused on 
text, history, or purpose — are ultimately unsatisfying. 
The words of the First Amendment, for example, are 
either inaccurate (Congress can, in fact, make laws 
that abridge free speech) or meaningless without 
additional information (what is “establishment 
of religion”?). Text alone will not yield answers 
to the meaning of the First Amendment. History 
does not provide much additional information. As 
Neuborne notes, and many lawyers and judges 
either forget or did not realize, the current muscular 
First Amendment is entirely a creature of the second 
half of the 20th century. “The nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries were free speech disasters,” 
with frequent government censorship of newspa-
pers and other punitive measures meted out for 
critical speech (page 6). 
But one cannot look to the purpose of the 
amendment for guidance without having to deter-
mine “whose purpose counts” (page 7). Neuborne 
explores the several often-recited purposes for 
the First Amendment: protecting the “free market 
of ideas” through an anti-regulatory approach, 
enhancing human dignity by protecting self-expres-
sion, keeping government out of the manipulation 
of communication. All of these purposes have been 
recognized in various decisions of the Supreme 
Court, and each has been ascendant at different 
times and in different contexts. Moreover, each can 
be deployed to different ideological ends.  For exam-
ple, Neuborne observes, the Supreme Court under 
Chief Justice John Roberts has included five more 
conservative justices who take a strong deregulatory 
approach to the First Amendment and four more 
liberal justices whose First Amendment interests focus 
on self-expression, tolerance, and self-governance. 
Neuborne argues that neither of these perspectives 
is complete or sufficient for answering many of the 
important First Amendment questions, and that 
the amendment should instead be understood as 
serving the purpose of supporting and protecting 
democratic governance. Neuborne wisely does not 
argue that he is actually demonstrating that James 
Madison was thinking about democracy when he 
crafted the First Amendment or the rest of the Bill of 
Rights. Instead, he says, whatever the purposes of 
those writing these original amendments might 
have been “[i] t is enough that what finally came out 
of Madison’s quill pen in the summer of 1789 was 
a precisely organized textual blueprint for a robust 
democracy” (page 11). The remainder of the book 
defends Neuborne’s reading of the Bill of Rights — and 
especially the First Amendment — as best interpreted 
as democracy-oriented and explains what that read-
ing would mean for constitutional jurisprudence.
One of the most interesting points in Madison’s 
Music comes before Neuborne turns to the First 
Amendment core of his argument. The first ten 
amendments, he argues, are not randomly ordered.  
Instead, there is a logic — a music — to their order that 
should inform how they are interpreted. Beginning 
with the First Amendment, which he describes 
as a “narrative of democracy,” Neuborne says the 
Amendment is structured on a “disciplined inside-to-
outside axis, beginning in the two religion clauses 
with freedom of thought, progressing through 
three ascending levels of individual interaction with 
the community — free expression of an idea by an 
individual, mass dissemination of the idea by a free 
press, and collective action in support of the idea by 
the people — and culminating in the petition clause 
with the introduction of the idea into the formal 
process of democratic lawmaking” (pages 17-18). 
His description of the First Amendment’s inside-
out order is a compelling and original one, and he 
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 Neuborne goes on to argue that the Second and 
Third Amendments were logical follow-ups to the 
First’s democratic core because the Framers were most 
worried about overthrow of their young democracy “by 
force of arms” (page 23).  The next five amendments 
— four through eight — “turn logically to the next most 
feared source of armed subversion of democracy — 
abuse of the civilian law enforcement power” (page 
25). Here, Neuborne notes, the amendments are 
structured in an order that chronologically follows the 
phases of law enforcement, from investigation (Fourth 
Amendment), through arrest (Fourth), accusation and 
interrogation (Fifth), adjudication (Sixth and Seventh), 
and punishment (Eighth).
 Finally, Neuborne argues, the Ninth and Tenth 
Amendments are properly understood as a necessary 
message to future generations about how to read 
the Bill of Rights and its balance of individual rights 
and government powers. The Ninth Amendment is 
an effort to ensure that the enumeration of some 
rights in the Bill of Rights should not be read to 
exclude other rights, and therefore should be read 
expansively. By contrast, the Tenth Amendment, 
which seeks to limit overreaching government 
power, “instructs future generations to read the 
power-granting text narrowly and to refrain from 
implying new powers through analogy and structural 
need” (page 29). Neuborne’s explanation of the 
Ninth Amendment is important to his argument 
about the proper reading of the First Amendment, 
as he ultimately argues that courts should recognize 
a right to vote, a right to run for office, and a right 
to fair representation as rights implied in the First 
Amendment. While they are not explicitly included 
in the text of the amendment, Neuborne argues 
that the structure of the amendment and the rights 
that are explicitly protected are best read to suggest 
these implied rights of democratic participation. It 
is the Ninth Amendment, he argues, through which 
James Madison and the other authors of the Bill of 
Rights gave courts the enduring power to recognize 
rights that are not explicitly listed in the first ten 
amendments if those implicit rights — like the now 
well-established implied right of association — are 
necessarily intertwined with those granted.
THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND OUR  
DEMOCRATIC PROCESS
Having elaborated on the structure of the First 
Amendment and its neighbors, and the importance 
of that structure for interpreting these provisions, 
Neuborne turns to the Supreme Court’s current juris-
prudence. The Court’s decisions on a host of election 
and campaign-related questions, he contends, would 
have reached fundamentally different answers under 
a democracy-focused reading of the First Amendment. 
The Supreme Court, Neuborne argues, has tolerated 
anti-democratic practices and surrendered politics 
to the wealthy, and it has done so through readings 
of the Constitution that were neither inevitable nor 
attractive. The root of the problem was the decision, 
which Neuborne refers to as “Justice Brennan’s 
Strategic Blunder,” to locate the right to vote in a “one 
person, one vote” equality principle, rooted in the 
Equal Protection Clause (page 40).  Grounding the 
right to vote — an implied right, since there is no right 
to vote explicit in the Constitution — in the Fourteenth 
Amendment instead of the First may protect against 
intentional efforts to deny the vote to particular groups 
of people, but it does not do a very good job of protect-
ing against more subtle forms of vote suppression 
or over-regulation. The “one-person, one-vote” ideal, 
moreover, has led to regular redrawing of district lines 
as populations change, which in turn has facilitated 
partisan gerrymandering and fewer contested legisla-
tive elections. If the right to vote were grounded in a 
First Amendment that was understood as embodying 
a democracy-reinforcing principle, Neuborne argues, 
laws that make voting more difficult or less meaning-
ful would be invalidated. A democracy-focused view 
of the First Amendment also would not have led to 
the conclusion that the right of association permits 
the major political parties to hold closed primaries 
or to impose rules that make it harder for nonparty 
members to participate in voting. And it would 
have led to entirely different outcomes on all of the 
Supreme Court’s campaign finance rulings, which 
Neuborne assails as irrational and deeply harmful 
to democracy.    
Neuborne’s critique of the current state of 
Supreme Court jurisprudence on redistricting, protect-
ing the right to vote, and campaign finance is articu-
late and persuasive. His argument that understanding 
the First Amendment as a “democracy-friendly” 
provision would lead to a complete revision of this 
jurisprudence is a heavier lift. For example, Neuborne 
suggests that a democracy-focused interpretation 
of the First Amendment would treat campaign 
spending as “communicative conduct” rather than as 
“pure speech,” thereby permitting greater regulation 
of campaign spending (page 80). While the Court’s 
decision to treat money as equivalent to speech 
is justly criticized, it is not immediately apparent 
why a democracy-focused approach would convert 
spending to “communicative conduct.” Perhaps, 
instead, a focus on functioning democracy would 
recognize the state’s interest in avoiding undue 
influence and the potential for corruption as a strong 
enough interest to permit more robust regulation 
of money in politics. As to gerrymandering and the 
power of the major political parties, it may well be 
that a focus on functioning democracy would cast 
greater suspicion on these aspects of our political 
system, but it is not clear what standards could be 
imposed on those establishing voting boundaries 
or other election rules. Neuborne suggests that, at 
a minimum, a democracy focus would prohibit line 
drawing that eliminates contested elections, permit 
greater ballot access for minor political parties, and 
limit the control that the major parties hold over the 
primary process.
The Court’s decisions 
on a host of election 
and campaign-related 
questions, [Neuborne] 
contends, would have 
reached fundamentally  
different answers under 
a democracy-focused 
reading of the First 
Amendment. 
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Neuborne’s concluding thoughts on how to 
improve the American democratic process demon-
strate that much of what could be done is not a matter 
of constitutional interpretation, but of political will. 
If we wanted to expand participation in our elections 
and eliminate the undue influence of money in 
politics, he suggests, we should publicly fund elections 
and do everything possible to eliminate voting barri-
ers, perhaps even considering the approach taken in 
Australia, where voting is a legal obligation and voting 
day is a holiday. Neuborne ends his exploration of how 
to improve our democratic process with
“this very troublesome question: is the real 
reason we tolerate so many unnecessary hurdles 
to voting that, deep down, we don’t want the 
poor to vote? Have we found the ideal hypocriti-
cal way to limit the franchise — formally guaran-
teeing everyone the right to vote, but under such 
a lukewarm, indeed hostile, standard of legal 
protection that we tolerate, indeed invite, regu-
latory hurdles that predictably disenfranchise 
the poor in large numbers, allowing us to blame 
them, not us, for the continued exclusion of the 
poor from American political life?” (page 96) 
It is a powerful question to end on, and one that 
highlights the moral underpinnings of Neuborne’s 
critique of both the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence 
and the regulations that define voting in the United 
States today.
WHO DOES THE FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECT?
In the second part of Madison’s Music, Neuborne 
makes a number of very interesting observations 
about how we currently understand the First 
Amendment. One of his central critiques is that the 
Supreme Court has over-privileged “speakers” in 
its interpretation of the First Amendment and has 
therefore failed to adequately appreciate the rights 
of “hearers” as well as the full meaning of the other 
First Amendment clauses. Neuborne describes the 
First Amendment as a “neighborhood” that includes 
“speakers, hearers, conduits (whose principal function 
is to transmit the speech of others to larger audiences), 
speech targets (persons discussed or described in 
the speech), and government speech regulators . . . ” 
(pages 98-99). The Court, he argues, “has anointed 
speakers as the neighborhood aristocrats” (page 99). 
In focusing so entirely on the rights of the speaker, the 
Court has too frequently failed to consider the rights of 
others in the First Amendment neighborhood. 
Neuborne points to several interesting conse-
quences of this failure. If we focused on the rights 
of the hearer, he suggests, we might be more open 
to government regulation of speech that falls short 
of “fighting words” but is nonetheless noxious, 
valueless, and threatening. As examples, he points 
to several Supreme Court decisions that have 
prohibited the regulation of speech that provided no 
useful information to hearers. In Snyder v. Phelps, 
131 S.Ct. 1207 (2011), the Court overturned an 
intentional infliction of emotional distress claim 
against an anti-gay church group that had picketed 
a funeral, concluding that the picketing had taken 
place on public land, and the group therefore could 
not face legal liability for its speech. In United States 
v. Alvarez, 132 S.Ct. 2537 (2012), the Court reversed 
the criminal conviction of a local politician who 
had falsely asserted that he was a Congressional 
Medal of Honor recipient. In Brown v. Entertainment 
Merchants Ass’n, 131 S.Ct. 2729 (2011), the Court 
invalidated a ban on the sale to children of violent 
video games that depicted simulated rape, torture, 
and murder. And in United States v. Stevens, 559 
U.S. 460 (2010), the Court struck down a statute 
that banned videos showing the wanton torture 
and violent killing of animals. In each of these 
cases, Neuborne argues, the Court is “fixat[ed] on 
speakers who run roughshod over others who live in 
the neighborhood” (page 109). Rather than being 
so scared of government regulation that we give 
speakers free reign, he argues, we should recognize 
the dignitary interests of hearers and establish regu-
latory rules with those interests, as well as speakers’ 
interests, in mind. 
Neuborne also raises the interesting question 
of what a right to free press would look like if we 
had not effectively collapsed it into the right of 
free speech. The right of free press is, after all, an 
independent clause in the First Amendment, and yet 
the Court has really never considered whether a free 
press right might include more than simply a right to 
free speech by the press. Neuborne queries whether 
a right of free press, understood as something other 
than speech, might include a right of access to infor-
mation or a right (and perhaps a duty) to offer voice 
to speakers whose voices have been silenced. A right 
of free press “might be both broader and narrower 
than the speech freedom currently enjoyed by the 
press.” The broader rights might include access that 
the press is currently denied, such as prisoners or 
government actors beyond official spokespeople. 
Press rights might be narrower, however, in that the 
press role as a conduit of information might demand 
some regulation designed to ensure access by the 
public and to prevent “any single press entity from 
becoming too powerful — a kind of First Amendment 
antitrust law” (page 126).
Neuborne’s vision of a better First Amendment, 
one that gives meaning to each of the words in that 
text, is not one with which everyone would agree. 
But it is appealing in its consistent commitment to 
the ideals of democratic participation and public 
access to valuable knowledge and ideas necessary to 
democratic engagement. At several points through-
out his book, Neuborne reminds us that the First 
Amendment’s evolution is recent history and “nothing 
about it is written in stone” (page 115). Madison’s 
Music is fundamentally a call for a re-envisioning of 
the First Amendment. It is aspirational, but Neuborne 
ends by urging his readers to believe that this 
aspirational, democratic, richer First Amendment can 
be achieved “if only [we]’ll try” (page 223).   
He may not persuade a reader who does not 
share his vision. But his willingness to engage with 
the complexities of the First Amendment and consti-
tutional interpretation make for a thought-provoking 
and insightful exploration of a host of particularly 
challenging questions. 
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